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Abstract
The socially just distribution of maritime spaces and their resources among States is a 
key concern of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This concern underlies 
the general apportionment of those spaces to coastal States as well as the concrete 
delimitation of any overlapping claims. The Convention prescribes that such delimita-
tion be equitable. Much attention so far has been given to the judicial performance of 
such maritime boundary delimitation. This paper focuses on the alternative of delimi-
tation by negotiated agreement of States. It conceives of delimitation as institutional-
ized oceans governance. This governance seeks to achieve the indeterminate objective 
of equitable delimitation by combining two broad approaches with machinery for 
their concretization. For one, the Convention adopts a geographical approach, imple-
mented through the concept of maritime zones extending seawards of the land. Yet the 
Convention also countenances a non-geographical approach based on historic titles 
grounded in customary law. For concretising these broad approaches into principles, 
rules, and decisions, the Convention institutionalizes comprehensive judicial decision-
making. Courts and tribunals have indeed developed an acquis judiciaire favouring 
delimitation by means of the equidistance/relevant circumstances method that is bind-
ing on States. However, the Convention gives preference to the equally institutional-
ized negotiated delimitation of marine entitlements, by means of the agreement of the 
coastal States concerned. These States therefore retain a considerable margin of appre-
ciation for negotiated delimitation, drawing on state practice to identify the principles 
appropriate for the individual instance. The paper first develops this governance 
framework and then exemplifies its workings in the case of the South China Sea, 
marked by several, ongoing maritime delimitation disputes to be resolved by negoti-
ated settlement.
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1 Introduction
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea aims to settle “all issues 
relating to the law of the sea”.1 The globally socially just distribution of the vast 
resources of the sea, living, and non-living, is one such issue. The Convention 
translates this issue into two governance tasks, i.e. the general apportionment 
of such resources among States and the delimitation of overlapping claims by 
several States to the same maritime spaces and their resources. On its face, 
the Convention merely prescribes that the delimitation achieves an equitable 
outcome.2 Since the drafting of the Convention, the search for equitable prin-
ciples infra legem that might assist in this task has been ongoing. The has 
mostly focused on the judicial development of such principles.3 
Yet, on their face, the relevant Convention provisions primarily mention 
delimitation by agreement of States.4 The first purpose of this paper is to 
develop a framework for delimitation that takes account of this value judg-
ment of the Convention. To do so, the delimitation of maritime spaces is seen 
as a task for institutionalized oceans governance. The overall objective of 
an equitable delimitation result is to be achieved on the basis of two broad 
normative approaches underpinned with political and judicial machinery 
for their legally binding concretization in contested instances. Pursuant to 
the rationale that the land dominates the sea, the Convention for one offers 
a geographical approach, through the concept of maritime zones seawards 
of the land, comprising the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, and 
the continental shelf. The Convention also countenances an  alternative, 
1    United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (done 10 December 1982, entry into force 
16 November 1994), 1833 UNTS 3, first preambular paragraph [hereinafter referred to as 
UNCLOS or the Convention]. Articles cited without particular references are those of the 
Convention.
2    Arts. 74 and 83. Only Art. 15 also offers a means to this effect.
3    For comprehensive literature references see Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation (Cambridge University Press 2015), in particular pp. 271–352.
4    See the wording of Arts. 15, 74 and 83 (“failing agreement”; “shall be affected by agreement”).
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non-geographical approach based on historic titles in customary law. These 
approaches then need to be concretized into operational principles, as well 
as rules and decisions. Courts and tribunals have been making consider-
able progress over time in developing such principles, culminating in the 
Arbitral Tribunal in the recent Bay of Bengal case declaring delimitation of 
overlapping claims of coastal States on the basis of the median line modi-
fied by relevant circumstances to constitute acquis judiciaire, which is said 
to form a source of law within the meaning of Art. 38(1)(d) of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice.5 These judicially developed principles 
leave a considerable margin of appreciation to States, and it thus falls on the 
political mechanism of the agreement of the coastal States concerned to 
achieve an overall equitable delimitation on the basis of the most suitable 
equitable principles.
The second purpose of the paper then is to exemplify the workings of delim-
itation by agreement of States. It uses the case of the South China Sea (SCS), for 
the twin reasons of that sea’s significance and of its capacity to test the paper’s 
model rigorously. First, the several, and acute delimitation disputes of the 
riparian States of that sea will have to be resolved by agreement, since a judi-
cial decision is not to be available at least as far as China is concerned. Second, 
the claims by its riparian States of entitlement to its resources are based on 
both zonal and non-zonal grounds, throwing into relief that any delimitation 
governance must accommodate both.
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 develops the Convention’s gen-
eral approach to the socially just distribution of marine resources seawards 
of the land, discussing the judicial shaping of equitable principles and their 
implications for settlement of delimitation disputes by agreement of States. 
Section 3 moves to exemplifying the insights gained, providing background on 
the SCS scenario. Section 4 establishes that the disputes of the SCS cannot be 
judicially decided as no court or tribunal has jurisdiction in regard to China. 
Section 5 examines what the applicable equitable principles are on which the 
riparian States could base a negotiated agreement for that sea. The Conclusions 
point out the implications of the article’s findings for analysts and for actors.
5    In the Matter of the Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (The People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh v The Republic of India), Award of 7 July 2014 [hereinafter referred to as Bay 
of Bengal Award], available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1376 (last vis-
ited on 29 April 2015).
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2 The Equitable Delimitation of Contested Maritime  
Entitlements under the Law of the Sea Convention: Norms, 
Machinery and Principles
The distribution of marine resources raises the question of global social jus-
tice. The Convention embodies a universal, rules-based approach to this dis-
tributive task. The overall objective of the Convention is to secure the just 
and equitable distribution of marine resources within the legal order of the 
oceans that the Convention establishes. It spells out this overall objective of 
its approach in its preamble. The Convention intends to establish an objec-
tive legal order for the oceans to promote the equitable utilization of marine 
resources, according to the third preambular paragraph of the Convention.6 
The achievement of that goal will then contribute to a just and equitable inter-
national economic order, as the next preambular paragraph indicates. The 
Convention distinguishes three categories of marine resources that end. First, 
it subjects the resources of the deep seabed, certainly the mineral resources 
thereof, to the principle of common heritage of mankind, involving a strong 
re-distributional element among all States. Secondly, the resources of the high 
seas are subject to the jurisdiction of each State, reverting to its capacity and 
will to exploit those. Thirdly, the resources landwards of the deep seabed 
and the high seas are subject to the jurisdiction of a specific State. In order 
to identify that State, the Convention employs two normative, equitable prin-
ciples. The Convention bases itself, first, on the approach that the land domi-
nates the sea (2.1). But it also countenances a role for the principle that historic 
uses of the sea ought to translate into present resource allocation (2.2). But 
the Convention also establishes bifurcated machinery for their application, 
in the shape of judicial and political decision-making in delimitation 
disputes (2.3). While it is true that the judicially developed equitable principles 
then become binding for States (2.4), States retain a considerable margin for 
delimiting their maritime boundaries (2.5).
2.1 The Land Dominates the Sea: Zonal Apportionment and Delimitation
The approach that the land dominates the sea, originally formed in custom-
ary law and incorporated into the Convention, captures the equitable norm 
6    The International Court of Justice has recently confirmed the central, and operational sig-
nificance of this preambular paragraph in Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. 
Colombia), [2012] ICJ Rep 624, paras. 113–31 [hereinafter Territorial and Maritime Dispute].
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that input ought to determine the share in the output.7 The input here is the 
presumed or generalized effort of the coastal state to husband the resources 
in the waters and seabed seawards of its coast. This geographical approach 
underlies the legal concept of maritime zones. The Convention designs three 
such maritime zones: the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, and the 
continental shelf, in which the coastal State is to enjoy sovereignty or sovereign 
rights over the resources found there. This approach then applies to the two dis-
tinct functions of apportionment of zones to individual coastal States vis-à-vis 
the international community and of delimitation of zones between two or 
more coastal States.8 In fact, the Convention law makes explicit that the delim-
itation of the maritime zones between States with adjacent or opposite coasts 
must achieve an equitable outcome.9 Equity here becomes equity infra legem.
2.2 Non-Zonal Apportionment and Delimitation
The role that geography plays in the apportionment and delimitation of 
marine resources under the Convention is, however, complemented by a 
non-geographical approach, in the shape of the role that historic title and his-
toric use play. This also is an equitable norm, not just one of legal certainty. 
Historic title and uses store concrete collective efforts, the sustained input into 
governing and using oceans spaces by a State and its citizens that ought to 
be considered with regard to the current distribution. However, historic title 
remains one of the least well-settled legal concepts of the Convention. No defi-
nition or test has been provided by a court or tribunal under the Convention 
since its entry into force, although the historic title would refer to legal concepts 
and facts predating the Convention. Both ITLOS and the Arbitral Tribunal in 
the two Bay of Bengal cases have avoided doing so in regard to the term “his-
toric title” featuring in Article 15, other than indicating that such title would 
have to be argued. To induce some doctrinal rigour, two questions then need to 
be distinguished.
The first question is the legal status of historic title. This is indeed a con-
cept of the customary international law of the sea, rather than the Convention. 
Historic title was first recognized in regard to maritime boundaries prior to 
the conclusion of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention in Anglo-Norwegian 
7    In the classic sense of proportionality, see Cecilia Albin, Justice and Fairness in International 
Negotiation (Cambridge University Press 2001), at 10.
8    North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands), [1969] ICJ Rep 3, 22, para. 18 [hereinafter North Sea Continental 
Shelf ].
9    Arts. 74(1), 83(1) UNCLOS.
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Fisheries. There, the ICJ defined historic waters as waters which are treated 
as internal or territorial waters but which would not have that character but 
for the existence of a historic title. The Court recognized the historic use of 
waters as a non-geographical factor capable of justifying the apportionment 
of waters to a State.10 In the case, the Court required the consistent practice of 
the coastal state claiming those waters—there through a system of straight 
baselines—and the toleration of that practice by the international community 
and any specially interested other State.11 The issue of historic title arose again 
at the Law of the Sea Conferences. A study by the UN Secretariat had defined 
historic waters as waters over which coastal states, contrary to generally appli-
cable rules of international law, clearly, effectively, and continuously, exercise 
sovereign rights with the acquiescence of the interested States. It appears 
that everyone was content with this at the First Conference.12 At the Third UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, States could not establish general agree-
ment on the role of historic titles for the allocation of maritime spaces.13 The 
Convention therefore recognizes the category of historic title as customary 
law. This was succinctly stated by the ICJ in Continental Shelf, for a Convention 
then still in draft:
[T]here are, however, references to “historic bays”, or “historic title” or his-
toric reasons in a way amounting to a clear reservation to the rules set 
forth therein [in the Convention]. It seems clear that the matter contin-
ues to be governed by general international law which does not provide 
for a single “regime” for “historic waters” or “historic bays”, but only for 
a particular regime for each of the concrete cases of “historic waters” or 
“historic bays”. It is clearly the case that, basically, the notion of historic 
rights or waters and that of the continental shelf are governed by distinct 
legal régimes in customary international law. The first régime is based on 
10    Anglo Norwegian Fisheries (UK v Norway), [1951] ICJ Rep 116, 133.
11    Ibid., pp. 116, 130, and 138–39. The UK in that case argued that historic title had two condi-
tions: (i) actual exercise of authority by the claimant State; and (ii) acquiescence by other 
States. By contrast, Norway had not required the latter.
12    UN Doc A/CN.4/143. The ILC had requested the study, but concluded that the topic did 
not require active consideration by the Commission in the near future at its twenty-ninth 
session, 3 May to 29 July 1977, ILC Report, A/32/10 (F), 1977, chp. V.E (b), para. 109, ILC Ybk, 
1977, VII (F).
13    Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd ed., Machester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999), at 456.
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acquisition and occupation, while the second is based on the existence of 
rights “ipso facto and ab initio”.14
There is a clear parallel with the acquisition of title over land, requiring the 
exercise of authority à titre de souverain reinforced by the absence of protest 
by other States. Such “historic titles must enjoy respect and be preserved as 
they have always been by long usage”, and a State may base distinct legal claims 
on that concept.15 In Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute handed down 
after the entry into force of the Convention,16 the Court endorsed Continental 
Shelf emphasizing that the statement from Anglo Norwegian Fisheries needed 
to be read in the light of the subsequent Continental Shelf.17 That case discusses 
the regime that such waters may have under customary law. The Chamber 
found the Gulf of Fonseca to constitute a historic pluri-state bay with a sui 
generis regime.18 This particular historical regime established by practice was 
especially important given the lack of any agreed and codified general rules 
even for single-State bays.19 The Chamber did not have to pronounce on the 
conditions for the coming into existence of such historic bays as the parties 
were agreed that the Gulf of Fonseca was a historic bay. But it can be surmised 
that the existence of a historic bay and its legal regime are subject to the usual 
conditions of customary law formation, including relevant concrete historical 
events such as international court judgments. This rationale can be transferred 
to the concept of historic title over waters.20 Such title forms in customary law 
and its concrete legal regime can be either sui generis, or it can be associated 
with any general and codified rules of the law of the sea, for instance on inter-
nal waters, territorial waters, or the exclusive economic zone.
The second question concerns the reference the Convention makes to this 
customary law concept of historic title. The last preambular paragraph of the 
Convention affirms “that matters not regulated by this Convention continue 
to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law” and 
14    Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), [1982] ICJ Rep 18, 74, para. 100.
15    Ibid., paras. 99 and 100 in fine.
16    Donald Rothwells and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2010), at 48–9, with footnote 110.
17    Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras, Nicaragua interven-
ing) [1992] ICJ Rep 351, 588, para. 384 [hereinafter Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute].
18    Ibid., paras. 384 and 412.
19    Ibid., para. 384.
20    On the relationship between both concepts, ibid., para. 383; Rothwell and Stephens, 
International Law of Sea, at 48.
 43The Equitable Distribution of Marine Resources
The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 1 (2015) 36–66
that makes clear that custom will continue to have a role in the law of the 
sea even after the Convention’s entry into force. It thus has to be established 
whether the Convention incorporates this custom, or rather leaves the issue to 
be regulated by customary international law outside the conventional regime. 
The Convention refers to historic title and similar notions of historic status in 
various contexts—bays (Art. 10(6)), maritime boundary delimitation (Art. 15), 
and archipelagic waters (Art. 46(b)). The Convention thus recognizes that 
the concept of historic status can be compatible with the very Convention 
establishing a legal order for the oceans.21 It then takes a position that incor-
porates some such historic status, while leaving others to the customary law. 
Thus, historic archipelagos are incorporated into the conventional regime, 
while historic bays are excepted from the conventional regime for juridical 
bays.22 For historic title over marine resources, the Convention’s position is 
that it incorporates those. Art. 15 states explicitly that historic title can be a 
relevant circumstance leading to deviating from the equidistance method 
in delimitation disputes. But this would now also apply to the exclusive eco-
nomic zone and the continental shelf, given the extension of the equidistance/ 
relevant circumstances method to these maritime zones in the recent juris-
prudence. Even the lesser historic use of marine resources becomes a factor of 
an equitable delimitation result. Where, for instance, access to historic fisher-
ies is cut off with catastrophic effect, that requires the equidistance line to be 
adjusted.23 By contrast, the Convention text is silent on historic title to waters 
located outside any of the conventional maritime zones of a coastal state. The 
incorporating reference is, however, implied. Extra-zonal, where a State’s claim 
is not based on any zonal entitlement, the customary historic title has a func-
tion of apportionment. The coastal State receives qua customary law exclusive 
rights over water and its resources that would otherwise be high seas or fall 
under the zonal entitlement of another State.
2.3 Judicial and Political Decision-making in Delimitation Disputes
Arts. 74(1) and 83(1) only enunciate the broad objective that an equitable out-
come is to be reached in every delimitation case. Both the zonal and the non-
zonal approaches described above can assist in this task, but they are located 
at considerable level of abstraction and thus are not capable of being directly 
applied in contested cases. Only Art. 15 also indicates a means to achieve this 
21    Territorial and Maritime Dispute, [2012] ICJ Rep 624, para. 113.
22    Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, [1992] ICJ Rep 351, 588, para. 382.
23    Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), [2009] ICJ Rep 61, 125, 
para. 196 [hereinafter Black Sea].
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outcome, providing that the median line (equidistance) method should be 
used unless there are special circumstances such as historic rights. 
However, the Convention compensates for the normative indeterminacy of 
this objective of equitable delimitation and the dearth of standards, by insti-
tutionalizing machinery for reaching an equitable result.24 It provides for both 
judicial decision-making and for political decision-making embodied in the 
legally binding agreement of States.
2.4 Developing Equitable Principles Judicially
The Convention provides for comprehensive judicial decision-making on 
delimiting maritime boundaries contested between States Parties. Art. 74(2) 
and 83(2) refer delimitation disputes to the procedures under Part XV entailing 
a binding decision. This is adjudication by ITLOS or the ICJ or arbitration as 
the default procedure (Art. 287(3)).
The court or tribunal having jurisdiction under Part XV will then not just 
decide the delimitation case at hand. It will also, in each case, contribute to 
the development of the equitable principles transferable to other cases. The 
socially just distribution of global goods, such as marine resources, is a matter 
of broad norms accepted internationally.25 Relevant equitable principles have, 
however, been fleshed out in a rich body of judgments and arbitral awards ren-
dered in marine boundary delimitation disputes. These judgments and awards 
coalesce around a clear preference for the equidistance/relevant circum-
stances method, applying it to the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, 
and the continental shelf. As restated in the most recent Bay of Bengal Award, 
this method has three stages. The first stage involves the identification of a pro-
visional equidistance line “using methods that are geometrically objective and 
also appropriate for the geography of the area in which the delimitation is to 
take place”.26 The second stage considers relevant circumstances that may call 
for the adjustment of the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an 
equitable result.27 The jurisprudence gives some guidance on the relevant con-
siderations.28 The decision whether to adjust a provisional equidistance line, 
as well as the decisions on how much and in which direction the line should 
24    Further John Linarelli (ed.), Research Handbook On Global Justice and International 
Economic Law (Edgar Elgar, 2013).
25    Albin, Justice and Fairness, at 34.
26    Bay of Bengal Award, para. 341.
27    Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: 
Equatorial Guinea intervening), [2002] ICJ Rep 303, 441, para. 288.
28    Particularly Black Sea, [2009] ICJ Rep 61.
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be adjusted, then requires an assessment of the facts and the probable impact 
of the provisional equidistance line, which is largely a matter of appreciation. 
The third stage consists of an ex post check of non-disproportionality of the 
result reached at the second stage for each maritime zone. 
The equidistance/relevant circumstances method is the default method for 
judicial maritime boundary delimitation. This is also true for the International 
Court of Justice,29 even though that court has stated that the three stage pro-
cess is not to be applied in a mechanical fashion and that it will not be appro-
priate in every case to begin with a provisional equidistance/median line.30 The 
main alternative is the angle-bisector method. It applies where there are “fac-
tors which make the application of the equidistance method inappropriate”,31 
generalizing irregular coastal features through a linear approximation of the 
relevant coasts. It starts with rendering the Parties’ relevant coasts as straight 
lines depicting their general direction. The angle formed by the intersection 
of these straight lines is then bisected to yield the direction of the delimita-
tion line. The functions of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf do not bar a court or tribunal from delimiting the outer continental 
shelves of two adjacent States along these lines pending the issuance of rec-
ommendations, although not of two coastal States with opposite coasts.32 This 
equidistance/relevant circumstances method is based upon geometric tech-
niques, as is the alternative angle—bisector method.33 These geometric tech-
niques express the foundational zonal principle for delimiting maritime zones 
between states. They are technical means for realizing the equitable principle 
that the maritime entitlement of a state should be proportionate the relevant 
coast, and thus its land.
2.5 The Margin of Appreciation of States
The elaborate provision of the Convention for judicial settlement of delimi-
tation disputes must not obscure the Convention’s preference for a negoti-
ated, political settlement of such disputes by the States concerned. Arts. 15, 74, 
and 83 make clear that coastal States locked in dispute are primarily to delimit 
29    Ibid., para. 116. The ICJ may have jurisdiction over a case of marine delimitation 
under Part XV, or on grounds of a special agreement, or its compulsory jurisdiction under 
Art. 36(2) of the ICJ Statute.
30    Territorial and Maritime Dispute, [2012] ICJ Rep 624, para. 194.
31    Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea 
(Nicaragua v. Honduras), [2007] ICJ Rep 659, 741, para. 272 [hereinafter Caribbean Sea].
32    Territorial and Maritime Dispute, [2012] ICJ Rep 624, paras. 113–131.
33    Bay of Bengal Award, para. 343.
46 Roeben
The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 1 (2015) 36–66
their maritime zones by agreement—territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, 
and continental shelf. The agreement reached either explicitly or tacitly will 
then be determinative. Such treaty becomes the legal form for the political 
agreement that the States concerned are to reach by way of negotiation. In 
this regard, the Convention imposes on the coastal States concerned both 
an obligation of conduct and result. The conduct of each State must be such 
that the negotiations are meaningful. And the result must be equitable. The 
Convention also provides procedures to aid States in reaching an agreement, 
in particular conciliation. In addition, they are supported by the administra-
tive mechanism embodied in the Outer Continental Shelf Commission, which 
issues recommendation to each State for delineating its single continental 
shelve beyond 200 nm.34 The role of these recommendations where the outer 
continental shelves of two States with opposite or adjacent coasts overlap is 
not specified. Arguably, States should base their delimitation agreement on 
any recommendation, while they may still deviate from them for good reasons. 
They may also reach that agreement pending one or both recommendations.
The judicial and the political mechanisms outlined are to a considerable 
degree alternatives, rather than fully interchangeable, because of the func-
tions and capacities each has and their impact on outcomes. A key issue then 
is the relationship between them. The substantive Convention provisions 
prioritize political decision-making as primary and judicial decision-making 
as secondary, because the latter becomes available only where the efforts at 
a negotiated settlement of the maritime boundaries of two or more States 
have been exhausted.35 The procedural law of the Convention reinforces 
this. Section 3 of Part XV counter-balances the principle of compulsory third 
party dispute settlement of a delimitation dispute with optional exceptions.36 
Art. 298(1)(a)(i) allows each State to make a constitutive declaration excepting 
34    David A. Colson, The Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf Between Neighboring 
States, 97 Am J Int’l L. (2003), at 94–96. According to Art. 76(8), a coastal State shall sub-
mit information on the limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nm to the CLCS. Its 
recommendation is a necessary condition for the exercise that each State holds under 
the Convention to delineate its outer continental shelf. The CLCS consists of twenty-one 
members who are experts in the field of geology, geophysics or hydrography and is to base 
its recommendations on geological, not geographical factors.
35    Cf. the second paragraphs of Arts. 74 and 83.
36    Art. 283 provides that only in the instance a negotiated settlement cannot be reached can 
either party submit the dispute to any of the procedures entailing binding decisions. The 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has understood this condition of 
the exercise of jurisdiction leniently, stating that it is for each State to determine when 
negotiations have been exhausted. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; 
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disputes involving delimitation and historic title, with reciprocal effect.37 
Art. 298 provides for optional exceptions in disputes concerning the existence 
of States’ rights, not the exercise of otherwise uncontested rights.38 States can 
except these disputes concerning their vital interests from compulsory dispute 
settlement, and reserve them to their ex post consent. Consent remains the 
cornerstone of judicial settlement of delimitation disputes, lest the entire sys-
tem of compulsory dispute settlement might become unacceptable.39 There is 
no inherent overarching principle of the international rule of law that would 
shift this balance. It is of course true that the international rule of law is gener-
ally well served by the availability of compulsory judicial dispute settlement. 
Yet, this requirement is teleological in nature.40 States Parties to UNCLOS have 
realized this requirement through Part XV balancing compulsory dispute settle-
ment with optional and general exceptions.41 The Convention, then, does not 
provide one single precept on the use of either of the two mechanisms it insti-
tutes for equitable delimitation outcomes. This rather is a matter of choice for 
each State, through the vehicle of (withheld) consent under Art. 298(1)(a)(i). 
It accepts the political and the judicial mechanisms of reaching equitable 
delimitation results as equivalent. As a consequence of the concrete choices 
of States, judicial decision-making will prevail in some parts of the world’s 
oceans, while in others it is the political decision-making. The Convention not 
prescribing a uniform mechanism entails that it contemplates non-uniform 
outcomes. This availability of choice will also entail asymmetries between the 
equitable principles underpinning political and judicial delimitation.
Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures, ITLOS Cases No. 3 & 4, Order of 27 August 1999, 
paras. 60–61.
37    28 parties have made such declarations whose scopes vary considerably. For an up-to-
date list of declarations, see http://www.un.org/Depts/los/settlement_of_disputes/
choice_procedure.htm (last visited 29 April 2015).
38    Arts. 298(1)(a)(ii) and (iii) relate to the margins of the law of the sea, military activities 
and the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for international security and 
peace.
39    Churchill and Lowe, Law of Sea, at 455.
40    Arthur Watts, The International Rule of Law, 36 German Yb Int’l L. (1993), at 15.
41    The general exceptions that apply automatically are concerned with disputes relating 
to the exercise by coastal States of rights otherwise recognized to exist, in particular in 
regard to fisheries (Art. 297(3)(a)). Rothwells and Stephens, International Law of Sea, 
at 459, note that across the exceptions Part XV reserves consensual jurisdiction for two 
major areas of controversy in the law of the sea, maritime boundaries and exclusive eco-
nomic zone fisheries.
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However, the said, judicially developed equitable principles will apply to 
all future delimitation disputes, and not just those submitted to third party 
settlement. The Convention imbues those principles, couched in abstract 
and general terms, with binding effect for courts when deciding cases and 
for States when settling their maritime boundaries by way of an agreement. 
The Convention’s underpinning the broad objective of equitable delimita-
tion with judicial machinery empowers that machinery to generate equitable 
principles at a lesser degree of abstraction susceptible of being applied in 
disputed cases.42 All pertinent rulings of courts and arbitral tribunals, includ-
ing those rendered under special agreements, where they converge on such 
a principle then indeed form an acquis judiciaire.43 This acquis is a source of 
international law under Art. 39(1)(d) ICJ Statute.44 It shapes the international 
law on which any delimitation must be based (Arts. 15, 74(1); 83(1)). Still, the 
reach of these judicially authorized principles has certain limitations, so that 
the States remain called upon to provide equitable principles through their 
practice. Three such limitations need be considered further.
Firstly, there are the uncertainties in the jurisprudence that result from the 
fact that a generalizable principle on an important delimitation but has not 
been developed yet. This is true in particular for the role of insular lands. When 
ITLOS was faced with the problem of islands in the delimitation process in its 
Bay of Bengal case,45 it simply stated that the effect to be given “depends on the 
geographic realities and the circumstances of the specific case” and that there 
was no general rule in this respect. Each case was unique and called for specific 
treatment, the ultimate goal being to reach a solution which was equitable.46 
Thus, ITLOS did not provide a principle or generalizable rule.47 As a result, the 
42    Declaration of Judge Wolfrum in ITLOS Bay of Bengal, at 2.
43    The question whether ITLOS’s jurisdiction in Bay of Bengal was compulsory or based on 
special agreement is discussed in the Individual Opinion of Judge Treves. Further Robert 
Kolb, Case Law on Equitable Maritime Delimitation: Digest and Commentaries (Martinus 
Niihoff, 2003).
44    Bay of Bengal Award, para. 339, reads: “The ensuing—and still developing—international 
case law constitutes, in the view of the Tribunal, an acquis judiciaire, a source of interna-
tional law under article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and 
should be read into articles 74 and 83 of the Convention”.
45    Caribbean Sea, [2007] ICJ Rep 659, para. 320; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the 
Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), [1984] ICJ Rep 246, 336, para. 222 
[hereinafter Gulf of Maine].
46    Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/
Myanmar), Case No. 16, para. 317 [hereinafter ITLOS Bay of Bengal].
47    Declaration of Judge Wolfrum in ITLOS Bay of Bengal, at 3.
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international jurisprudence on the role of islands in the delimitation process 
continues to lack the necessary coherence.48
Secondly, the judicially developed principles so far involve a considerable 
margin of appreciation on the facts. This is also true for the equidistance 
line.49 States also retain a margin of appreciation as to the law, since they may 
determine their zonal entitlements under the Convention by way of an agreed 
method that deviates from the median line.50 In addition, the ICJ in North 
Sea Continental Shelf emphasized that “there is no legal limit to the consid-
erations that states may take into consideration for the purposes of making 
sure that they arrive at equitable principles”.51 This remains the case under the 
Convention.52 States settling their maritime boundary by agreement have a 
range of options to accommodate their individual and joint interests in the 
maritime area under consideration.53 The 2010 Barents Sea Treaty between 
Norway and the Russian Federation illustrates that. Concluding almost 
40 years of negotiations,54 that Treaty defines the single maritime boundary 
that divides the Parties’ continental shelves and exclusive economic zones in 
the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean as a comprise between the strict equidis-
tance line proffered by Norway and the bisector line proffered by Russia. It also 
obligates them to continue their cooperation on fisheries and to coordinated 
exploitation of trans-boundary hydrocarbon resources.
Thirdly, the capacity of courts and tribunals to develop equitable delimita-
tion principles remains inherently circumscribed. The court or tribunal only 
has jurisdiction to delimit those sea areas marked by overlapping claims by the 
48    Ibid., at 5.
49    Ibid. (asking why this and not another equidistance line).
50    Bay of Bengal Award, para. 339: “Since Articles 74 and 83 of the Convention do not pro-
vide for a particular method of delimitation, the appropriate delimitation method— 
if the States concerned cannot agree—is left to be determined through the mechanisms 
for the peaceful settlement of disputes”. (Emphasis added).
51    North Sea Continental Shelf, [1969] ICJ Rep 3, para. 85.
52    Natalie Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Cambridge 
University Press 2005), at 247; Bernard Oxman, Political, Strategic and Historical consider-
ations, 26 University of Miami Inter-American Law Review (1994), at 256.
53    Rothwells and Stephens, International Law of Sea, at 409.
54    Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning 
Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean (done 
15 September 2010, entered into force 7 July 2011), available at http://www.regjeringen 
.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/avtale_engelsk.pdf (last visited 29 April 2015); see Tore 
Henriksen and Geir Ulfstein, Maritime Delimitation in the Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty, 
42 Ocean Development & International Law (2011), at 1.
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disputing; seas to which only one State can or does lay a claim cannot be sub-
ject to judicially defined delimitation principles. Nor may the court or tribunal 
develop any re-distributional principles.55 Redistribution remains the exclu-
sive domain of the agreement of states. Within its competence, the adversar-
ial procedure of the court or tribunal will be a limitation, as the judgment or 
award will depend on what the parties have argued or are agreed upon. For 
instance, in both Bay of Bengal cases the ITLOS and the Tribunal highlighted 
that the parties had not argued the presence of any historic titles and therefore 
did not consider those.56 Finally, the very methodology and legitimacy of judi-
cial decision-making creates a preference for legal certainty, and their trans-
parent application. The actual maritime boundary delimitation by courts and 
tribunal on the basis of general rules that lend themselves to being judicially 
operated reflects that.57
3 The Case of the South China Sea
The above developed framework for reaching equitable delimitation results 
under the Convention is coming to be tested in the case of the South China 
Sea (SCS). That sea is a marginal ocean basin of the Pacific Ocean totaling 
3.5 million square kilometers and an average depth of over 2000 meters.58 It 
contains four archipelagos: the Dongsha/Pratas Islands in the north, Zhongsha 
Islands/Macclesfield Bank and Huangyan Dao/Scarborough Shoal in the 
east, the Xisha Islands/Paracels to the west, and the Nansha Islands/Spratlys 
to the south. The SCS is the second most used global sea-lane, connecting the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans. Its natural living and non-living resources are of 
regional and worldwide significance.59 All riparian States are parties to the 
Convention and claim the 200 nm exclusive economic zone and continental 
shelf from their mainland costs, leaving an area of high seas in the centre of the 
SCS. Six riparian States presently assert sovereignty claims to the SCS islands 
55    Bay of Bengal Award, para. 397.
56    ITLOS Bay of Bengal, para. 130; Bay of Bengal Award, para. 227.
57    Bay of Bengal Award, para. 344.
58    International Hydrographic Organization, Limits of Oceans and Seas (3rd ed, 1953) § 49.
59    The region has proven oil reserves of around 1.2 km³ (7.7 billion barrels), with an estimate 
of at least 4.5 km³ (28 billion barrels) in total. Natural gas reserves are estimated to total 
around 7,500 km³.
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and/or waters.60 China controls the Xisha Islands/Paracels and seven features 
of the Nansha Islands/Spratlys, while Vietnam controls twenty-one features of 
the latter. The Philippines maintains claims to a portion of the Nansha Islands/
Spratlys and controls eight of them, referring to them as the Kalayaan Island 
Group. China and Taiwan both claim sovereignty over the four groups of 
insular features and surrounding waters and seabed, an area enclosed by the 
so-called Nine-Dash-Line.61
4 The Non-availability of Judicial Decision-making in the SCS
On 22 January 2013, the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings against 
China under Part XV and Annex VII.62 Its application comprises two cen-
tral submissions: that (i) China’s Nine-Dash-Line is unlawful under the 
Convention, and that (ii) the status of the disputed insular features under 
Art. 121 be determined.63
In its first submission, The Philippines allege that the Nine-Dash-Line is 
unlawful under the Convention. This application constitutes a dispute con-
cerning the interpretation and application of the Convention.64 The differing 
60    For an overview, see Choon-ho Park, The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns the Islands 
and the Natural Resources? Ocean Development & Int’l L.(1978), at 30, Marwyn S. Samuels, 
Contest for the South China Sea (Methuen 1982); Christopher C. Joyner, The Spratly Islands 
Dispute: Rethinking the Interplay of Law, Diplomacy, and Geo-Politics in the South China 
Sea, 13 Int’l J of Marine & Coastal L. (1998), at 195. France and Japan have renounced any 
claims.
61    For references and discussion of the Nine-Dash-Line see foonotes 76–81 infra and accom-
panying text.
62    The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China (http://www.pca-cpa 
.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1529 (last visited 29 April 2015). The members of the Arbitral 
Tribunal are Judge Thomas A. Mensah (President), Judge Jean-Pierre Cot, Judge Stanislaw 
Pawlak, Professor Alfred H.A. Soons, and Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum. The dispute has gener-
ated diverging scholarly positions, compare the contributions in S. Jayakumar, Tommy 
Koh and Robert Beckman (eds.), The South China Sea Disputes and Law of the Sea (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2014) with those in Stefan Talmon and Bing Bing Jia (eds.), The South 
China Sea Arbitration: A Chinese Perspective (Hart/Bloomsbury 2014).
63    Republic of the Philippines, Notification and Statement of Claim on West Philippine Sea, 
22 January 2013, available at http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/unclos 
(last visited 29 April 2015).
64    The Tribunal has to characterize the legal dispute on objective grounds giving particular 
attention to the formulation of the dispute chosen by the Applicant. The dispute itself 
then has to be distinguished from the arguments advanced by either party in support 
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views on the legality of the Nine-Dash-Line under the Convention consti-
tute the dispute. This is to be distinguished from whether the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal over this dispute is existent or excepted, by virtue of Art. 298.65 
The Arbitral Tribunal has to find jurisdiction of its own motion, regardless of 
China’s rejection of arbitration.66 Art. 5 of Annex VII confirms that it is for 
the Tribunal to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction in the case. Its 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz is not affected by one party’s non-appearance,67 even 
though that of course does not remove the problem that the non-appearance 
of one party deprives the Tribunal of critical factual information and legal 
argument.68 The jurisdiction of the Tribunal in this case turns on whether it 
is excepted by virtue of the Declaration lodged by China under Art. 289. The 
Declaration of China summarily refers to Art. 298(1) and is thus coextensive 
with the scope of the optional exception clause.69
This makes it necessary first to determine the scope of the conventional 
optional dispute clause. Of relevance here is subparagraph a) (i) of that provi-
sion (4.1). There then follows the second step of determining whether the pres-
ent disputes fall thereunder.70 These disputes concern the substance of the 
of their claims. ICJ, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), [1998] ICJ Reports 432, 
paras. 30–32.
65    The Arbitral Tribunal in Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United 
Kingdom), Award of 15 March 2015, para. 211, focuses on the true or objective nature of 
the dispute, rather than referring to the application. This confuses the separate tasks 
of determining the dispute and jurisdiction over this dispute.
66    Note Verbale, 1 August 2013. In December 2014, China published a “Position Paper of the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South 
China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines” in which it set out 
China’s view that the Arbitral Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to consider the Philippines’ sub-
missions. The Tribunal will treat China’s communications including the Position Paper as 
constituting a plea concerning the Arbitral Tribunal’s jurisdiction for purposes of Art. 20 
of its Rules of Procedure (Fourth Procedural Order, 22 April 2015).
67    The Arctic Sunrise Case (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Provisional 
Measures, ITLOS Case No. 22, Order of 22 November 2013 [hereinafter Arctic Sunrise].
68    Cf. Joint individual opinion of Judges Wolfrum and Kelly in Arctic Sunrise, para. 6.
69    The Chinese Declaration (2006) reads: “The Government of the People’s Republic of 
China does not accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the 
Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a)(b) 
and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention”. Available at: United Nations, Division for Ocean 
Affairs and Law of the Sea, Declarations and Statements, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm (last visited 29 April 2015).
70    Arctic Sunrise confirms this two-step analysis (paras. 41 and 45 in regard to the Declaration 
of the Russian Federation under Art. 298).
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Nine-Dash-Line (4.2), its form (4.3) on the one hand, and the legal status of the 
insular features of the SCS (4.4), on the other.
4.1 Scope of the Optional Exception Clause of the Convention  
(Art. 298(1)(a)(i) UNCLOS)
Art. 298(1)(a)(i) has two variants that except two different though closely 
related types of disputes. The first variant excepts “disputes concerning inter-
pretation or application of Arts. 15, 74, and 83 relating to sea boundary delimi-
tations”. For a dispute to be a delimitation dispute, at its heart there must be 
overlapping claims by States to parts of the sea based on the concepts of the 
territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, or the continental shelf. The rationale 
of this exception is that such disputes concern the existence of the sovereign 
rights of the coastal State and that the standards on sea boundary delimita-
tion have not been clarified sufficiently.71 This rationale has not been super-
seded, since the law on maritime boundary delimitation is still evolving.72 
Art. 298(1)(a)(i) in its second variant excepts disputes “involving historic titles”. 
Within Art. 298(1)(a)(i), historic titles form a category of dispute that is sepa-
rate from maritime delimitation disputes. This is clear from the fact that the 
Convention already treats historic title as part of the zonal maritime delimi-
tation. Disputes involving historic title include both their interpretation and 
application, so that disputes regarding the rules on historic titles as well as 
their concrete existence are excepted. The wording of the provision indicates 
that ‘historic title’ is separate from other conventional concepts. Importantly, 
then, the term does not refer exclusively to historic title where recognised by 
the Convention.73 Disputes involving other historic titles are covered as well. 
This also corresponds to the object and purpose of the provision. Since con-
sensus on a conventional definition of historic title proved elusive at the Third 
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea,74 the solution that the Convention prof-
fers in this situation is to proceduralise this substantive law question. A court 
or tribunal is competent to consider customary title incidentally (Art. 293(1)).75 
Art. 298(1)(a)(i) is situated within the context of the dispute settlement 
provisions of the law of the sea. This exception to jurisdiction therefore has 
a plausibility requirement. Just as a claimant State needs to make its claim 
71    Churchill and Lowe, Law of Sea, at 456.
72    Bay of Bengal Award, paras. 97–100.
73    Cf. the wording of Art. 15 (“historic title or other special circumstances”).
74    Churchill and Lowe, Law of Sea, at 456.
75    The “ARA Libertad” Case (Argentina v. Ghana), Provisional Measures, ITLOS Case No. 20, 
Order of 15 December 2012, para. 98.
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plausible on law and on fact under the Convention to be able to invoke the 
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal, the reverse holds true. In particular, claims 
to historic title by one party must be substantiated and must comprise a sub-
stantial part of the overall dispute to ground an exception the jurisdiction of 
the court or tribunal that would otherwise exist. 
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal over the dispute as to the lawfulness of the Nine-
Dash-Line is thus excepted if it has to be determined by reference to Arts. 15, 
74, and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations or the rules on historic title. 
Answering this question requires an assessment of the objective substance of 
the Nine-Dash-Line.
4.2 The Substance of the Nine-Dash-Line Falls under Art. 298
The substance of the Nine-Dash-Line is matter of its content, status and func-
tion, seen in the context of China’s actions in regard to the SCS.
As to its content, China’s U-Shaped Line is composed of nine dashes and 
extends to the southern part of the SCS, adjacent to the shores of Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines.76 The original version of the 
Line appeared in a Chinese map in 1914, drawn by Chinese cartographer Hu 
Jin Jie. The Line was first published as a map by the then Chinese Nationalist 
Government in February 1948, composed of eleven dashes and entitled The 
Location Map of the South China Sea Islands. After the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China two dashes were removed in 1953, excluding the Beibu Gulf/
Gulf of Tonkin.77 The Nine-Dash-Line is to be placed in the context of the acts 
in regard to the SCS that China has taken under international and national law.
On ratification of the Convention in 1996, China made a Declaration pro-
viding that it shall enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction over an exclusive 
economic zone of 200 nm and the continental shelf, that it will affect through 
consultations the delimitation of boundary of the maritime jurisdiction with 
the States with coasts opposite or adjacent to China respectively on the basis 
76    For the considerable literary discussion of the Nine-Dash-Line, see Zhiguo Gao and 
Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implication, 
107 AJIL (2013), at 98; Masahiro Miyoshi, China’s “U-Shaped Line” Claim in the South China 
Sea: Any Validity Under International Law? 43 Ocean Development & Int’l L. (2012), at 1; 
Erik Francks and Marco Benataar, Dots and Lines in the South China Sea: Insights from 
the Law of Map Evidence, 2 Asian J of Int’l L. (2012), at 89; Thang Nguyen-Dang and Hong 
Thao Nguyen, China’s Nine-Dotted Lines in the South China Sea: The 2011 Exchange of 
Diplomatic Notes, 43 Ocean Development & Int’l L. (2011), at 35; Li Jinming and Li Dexia, 
The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note, 34 Ocean Development 
& Int’l L. (2003), at 287.
77    Li and Li, Dotted Line of SCS, 290.
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of international law and in accordance with the equitable principle, and that 
it reaffirms its sovereignty over all its archipelagos and islands as listed in 
Art. 2 of the 1992 Law.78 The Nine-Dash-Line was internationally used by China 
for the first time in 2009, being attached as a map to its response to the joint 
submission to the Commission on the Limits of the continental shelf made by 
Malaysia and Vietnam. The Chinese Note states that the Line includes “sover-
eignty over the islands in the South China Seas and the adjacent waters” and 
“sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed 
and subsoil”.79 In response to a Philippines Note Verbale,80 China restated in 
2011 in another Note that it had sovereign rights over the islands, waters and 
the seabed of the SCS, on historic and legal grounds, and to the maritime zones 
generated by the Nansha Islands/Spratlys, a territorial sea, contiguous zone, 
exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf.81
The pertinent national legislation is in essence as follows. The Declaration 
on Territorial Sea of 4 September 1958 announced that a 12 nm territorial sea 
surrounds all Chinese territories, including the Chinese mainland, the specifi-
cally named SCS islands, and all those other islands claimed by China which 
are separated from the mainland and its coastal islands by high seas.82 In 1992, 
China promulgated its Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.83 
78    China’s Declaration of UNCLOS upon Ratification on 7 June 1996 is available at http://
www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China 
(last visited 29 April 2015). For the 1992 Law referred to in the declaration see footnote 85 
infra.
79    CML/17/2009, 7 May 2009, para. 2. It reads: “China has indisputable sovereignty over 
the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights 
and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see 
attached map). The above position is consistently held by the Chinese Government, and 
is widely known by the international Community”. See also the Letter CML/18/2009 for 
the identically worded objection to Vietnam’s individual submission. These documents 
are available at the website of the CLCS.
80    Note Verbale 000228, 5 April 2011.
81    CML/8/2011, 14 April 2011, para. 1: “China’s sovereignty and related rights and jurisdic-
tion in the South China Sea are supported by abundant historical and legal evidence” 
(Emphasis added).
82    In response, North Vietnam’s then prime minister, Phạm Văn Đô�ng, sent a diplomatic note 
to his counterpart Zhou Enlai, stating that “The Government of the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam respects this decision”, available at http://www.spratlys.org/collection/ 
claims/vietnam/vietnam1.htm (last visited 29 April 2015).
83    “China’s Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,” available at http://www 
.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILS/CHN_1992_Law.pdf (last visited 
29 April 2015) [hereinafter referred to as 1992 Law].
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Art. 2 of that Law includes within its land territory the four island groups in the 
SCS as well as other islands comprised within China’s twelve-mile territorial 
sea. Art. 3 authorizes the use of straight baselines for measuring the breadth 
of the territorial sea; the baselines for the Xisha Islands/Paracels consist of 
straight lines linking twenty-eight coordinates. In 1998, China established 
its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf “throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory”, which comprises the said SCS insular fea-
tures according to the 1992 Law.84 Art. 14 of the 1998 Act provides that “the 
provisions of [the] Act shall not affect the historical rights of the People’s 
Republic of China”.85
The principal physical embodiment of the Nine-Dash-Line then is a map 
to which certain unilateral acts by China make reference. The general status 
of maps is under international law is that they have evidential, not constitu-
tive value for an international legal act, such as a treaty, a court decision, or a 
unilateral act.86 A map may, however, serve as context for the interpretation 
of any such act. The international jurisprudence makes that plain. The ICJ, 
after discussing the evidential value of maps in Frontier Dispute, there stated 
that maps may acquire legal force “when [they] are annexed to an official text 
of which they form an integral part”.87 Similarly, the Arbitral Tribunal in Bay of 
Bengal considered that it should not attempt to establish the land boundary 
terminus “on the basis of the wording of the Radcliffe Award without giving 
due regard to the attached map”.88
Whatever the understanding of the Nine-Dash-Line was before the time 
that China became bound by the Convention, it has referred to it in making 
claims after becoming party to the Convention. These claims are unilateral 
acts.89 Unilateral acts need to be interpreted with particular weight accorded 
to the discernible intention of the acting State.90 The relevant Chinese prac-
84    “Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act of 26 June 1998,” available at http://
www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILS/CHN_1998_eez_act.pdf 
(last visited 29 April 2015) [hereinafter referred to as 1998 Act].
85    Emphasis added. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Historical Evidence to 
Support China’s Sovereignty Over the Nansha Islands,” available at http://www.coi.gov.cn/
scs/article/2.htm (last visited 29 April 2015).
86    Francks and Benataar, Insights from Law of Map Evidence, at 89–118.
87    Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), [1986] ICJ Rep 554, 582, para. 54.
88    Bay of Bengal Award, para. 184.
89    On the variety of unilateral acts, see Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 
416 (James Crawford, 8th ed., OUP 2012).
90    Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v. Rwanda), [2006] ICJ Rep 28, paras. 49–50.
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tice then comprises in particular the 1996 Declaration, the 2009 Note, and 
the 2011 Note, which express claims in the maritime zone categories of the 
Convention.91 The 2011 Note in particular reiterated the historic entitlement 
under customary law,92 in response to the express challenge contained in a 
preceding Philippines Note.93 The Nine-Dash-Line as embodied in interna-
tionally used maps then aids in the interpretation of these claims in regard 
to the SCS. Through it, China intends to evidence the geographical extent of 
the different rights it claims under the Convention and customary inter-
national law.
The principal function of the Nine-Dash-Line then is a summary reference 
to the bundle of concrete zonal claims in regard to the waters and the sea-
bed that fall under the categories of territorial sea, exclusive economic zone 
and continental shelf, as generated by the mainland of China and the claimed 
insular lands in the SCS. These claims are plausible. The concrete insular lands 
potentially generate relevant maritime zones, certainly the Nansha Island/
Spratlys and also Huangyan Dao/Scarborough Shoal regardless of whether 
it is an island or a just a rock with a territorial sea. The general rules on the 
delimitation of the maritime zones of states with opposing coasts also apply 
to off-lying insular lands. It is true that the International Court of Justice has 
occasionally disregarded very small islands or not given them their full poten-
tial entitlement to maritime zones, where this would have a disproportionate 
effect.94 In other instances, however, the Court has acknowledged that insular 
features create their own maritime zones and taken these into consideration 
in delimiting the zones of the other party with an opposite coast.95 And so has 
ITLOS.96 These plausible claims then define a zonal delimitation dispute fall-
ing under Art. 298(1)(a)(i) first variant. The Nine-Dash-Line is thus inextricably 
linked to these zonal claims of China.
91    CML/8/2011, para. 3: “In addition, under the relevant provisions of the 1982 
UNCLOS . . . China’s Nansha Island is fully entitled to Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic 
Zone (exclusive economic zone) and continental shelf”.
92    CML/8/2011, para. 1: “China’s sovereignty and related rights and jurisdiction in the South 
China Sea are supported by abundant historical and legal evidence” (Emphasis added).
93    Philippines Note, 5 April 2011, under “On the Other ‘Relevant Waters, Seabed and Subsoil’ 
in the SCS”.
94    Black Sea, [2009] ICJ Rep 61, para. 185 with references.
95    Territorial and Maritime Dispute, [2012] ICJ Rep 624, para. 125.
96    ITLOS Bay of Bengal, para. 169 (“accorded off lying St. Martin’s Island (Bangladesh) an 
own territorial sea of 12 nm on the ground that otherwise the sovereign rights of Myanmar 
in its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf would have greater weight than to 
the sovereignty of Bangladesh”.)
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Residually, the Nine-Dash-Line refers to claims based on historic title over 
waters and the seabed of the SCS, which it also evidences. These claims have 
been made in other forms, in particular the 2011 Note. It is plausible that there 
can be historic title to SCS waters held by China within and beyond its claimed 
maritime zones, both on law and on fact. That is the case. As shown above, 
under the Convention historic title can play a role infra-zonal, as a relevant 
circumstance for the equitable delimitation of two opposite coasts. And his-
toric title can play a role extra-zonal, as acquisition of waters falling under 
established concepts or as special regime under the customary law of the sea. 
The parties may disagree as to the role for historic title, in particular in regard to 
zones of overlap resulting from projections seaward from the mainland coast, 
and on as to whether such a customary regime has actually formed on the use 
of the fishery resources in the SCS. Yet both these disputes concerning the legal 
role and the concrete regime of such rights “involve” non-zonal historic title 
and are, for that reason, excepted from the jurisdiction of the tribunal by virtue 
of Art. 298(1)(a)(i) second variant.
Substantively, the Nine-Dash-Line is thus an integral part of the claims of 
China in regard to marine zones and/or historic title in the SCS, to be delim-
ited from those of the Philippines. These claims fall under Arts. 15, 74, or 83 of 
the Convention. The dispute as to the substance of the Nine-Dash-Line is thus 
excepted by Art. 298(1)(a)(i) first and second variant.
4.3 The Form of the Nine-Dash-Line
However, the Philippines submission may be taken to address not the substance, 
but the form of the Nine-Dash-Line, that is the very means by which China 
expresses and evidences its claims. The critical question is whether the form 
in which a State expresses its claims to maritime zones and titles can affect a 
right that the applicant can plausibly point to as potentially violated. Yet, there 
is no separate right of a state that another make its maritime claim in a specific 
form. The Convention does not have a numerus clausus of forms of actions for 
States parties, which remain free to express their intention in a manner they 
choose. State practice under the Convention and in many judicial delimita-
tion cases confirms that States state their claims in maximal forms. It may be 
desirable that States make their maritime claims in a manner that is as precise 
and as possible. But as long as the form chosen does not constitute a refusal to 
negotiate contrary to Arts. 15, 74(1), and 83(1), it remains ancillary to what is in 
essence a dispute over maritime delimitation, historic title, and sovereignty 
over insular land.
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4.4 The Legal Status of the Insular Features of the SCS
The Philippines second application regarding the status of the insular lands 
in the SCS under the Convention also falls under 298(1)(a)(i). The status of 
these concrete insular lands cannot be determined in the abstract. Rather, 
qualifying these insular lands under Art. 121 would have a direct impact on 
the maritime delimitation dispute pending between the Philippines and 
China and which is excepted by Art. 298. The qualification of these insular 
lands, whether they are islands at all, and then whether they are rocks with 
just a territorial sea or full islands with an exclusive economic zone and a 
continental shelf, thus determines, as an automatic and direct consequence 
the existence and the extent of the maritime zones they entail. 
In addition, Art. 298(a)(i) in fine makes clear that disputes that involve the 
concurrent consideration of sovereignty over insular land are excepted from 
compulsory dispute settlement. Yet, assessing the status of these insular lands 
necessarily involves the consideration of the sovereignty over these lands.97 
For an abstract question relating to the Convention will not ground the juris-
diction of the Tribunal.98 A State may only request clarification of the status of 
such insular lands over which it is sovereign or claims sovereignty. Sovereignty 
over the Nansha Islands/Spratlys and Huangyan Dao/Scarborough Shoal being 
claimed by both parties to the dispute, the status of these insular lands under 
the Convention involves the concurrent consideration of disputed sovereignty 
over these lands, and it thus becomes a dispute excepted by Art. 298(1)(a)(i).
5 Principles for Political Decision-making on the Disputed Lands  
and Waters of the SCS
It falls on the riparian States of the SCS to achieve the equitable resolution 
of their overlapping claims by way of one or several negotiated agreements. 
Pending a final agreement, States are to “make every effort to enter into 
97    This is a specific exception of sovereignty disputes within Art. 298. No position needs to 
be taken on whether sovereignty disputes generally fall outside Part XV. This is the posi-
tion of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Chagos Marine Protected Area case. Generally, Irina 
Buga, Territorial Sovereignty Issues in Maritime Disputes: A Jurisdictional Dilemma for Law 
of the Sea Tribunals, 27 Int’l J of Marine & Coastal L. (2012), at 59.
98    The M/V “Louisa” Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Kingdom of Spain), ITLOS Case 
No. 18, paras. 93–155.
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 provisional arrangements of a practical nature” (Art. 74(3) and Art. 83(3)).99 
States may draw on the procedures that Section 1 of Part XV of the Convention 
devises.100 
Such maritime delimitation disputes that are excepted from a judi-
cial or arbitral decision then become subject to mandatory conciliation. 
The parties will then be obligated to negotiate an agreement that imple-
ments the conciliation proposal (Art. 298(1)(a)(ii)). Where they do not reach 
agreement, any third party-settlement again presupposes their mutual con-
sent. Although the wording of Art. 298(1)(a)(ii) is unclear in this respect, 
this interpretation reflects Art. 299 stating that any dispute excepted under 
Art. 298 may be submitted to third party-settlement only with the consent of 
both parties. 
However, delimitation disputes requiring the concurrent determination of 
disputed sovereignty over insular land are not subject to this mandatory con-
ciliation (Art. 298(1)(a)(i) in fine). The term “insular land” refers to Art. 121(1) 
adopting the general definition under international law of islands as any land 
above water at high time regardless to size. The sovereignty question arises 
“concurrently” in a dispute concerning the delimitation of maritime bound-
aries where the insular land is situated within 200 nm of the coast of either 
party.101 That is the case for the insular lands disputed between the Philippines 
and China located within 200 nm of the coast of the Philippines. It is unclear 
whether this removes from mandatory conciliation the dispute in its entirety 
or only to the extent that the concrete insular lands and maritime zones that 
they generate are concerned, in which case the boundary would remain subject 
to mandatory conciliation to the extent that the disputed land is not affected.102
Given that the claims of the parties to the waters and the seabed of the SCS 
overlap, even though based on different entitlements, the overarching obliga-
99    See Natalie Klein, Provisional Measures and Provisional Arrangements in Maritime 
Boundary Disputes, 21 Int’l J of Marine & Coastal L. (2006), at 423; Rainer Lagoni, Interim 
Measures Pending Maritime Delimitation Agreements, 78 Am J of Int’l L. 2 (1984), at 345; 
Robert Beckman, The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in 
the South China Sea, 107 AJIL (2013), at 158.
100    But others can also be used. In Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and 
around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Provisional Measures, ITLOS Case 
No. 12, ITLOS suggested the parties use a panel of experts.
101    Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. 
Bahrain), [2001] ICJ Rep 40, 101–102, para. 205 [hereinafter Maritime Delimitation and 
Territorial Questions]; Caribbean Sea, [2007] ICJ Rep 659, para. 302. See, however, the 
inconclusive reasoning in Black Sea [2009] ICJ Rep 61, 125, para. 179.
102    Oxman, Political, Strategic and Historical Considerations, at 269.
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tion for the riparian States then is to achieve an equitable delimitation of the 
areas concerned, “on the basis of international law”. In what follows, the paper 
sets out two relevant equitable principles for discharging this obligation.
5.1 The Land Dominates the Sea
The Bay of Bengal Tribunal, in justifying its delimitation decision, has high-
lighted the notion that the land dominates the sea.103 This equitable principle 
also covers insular land of the SCS. Art. 121 confirms that islands are capable of 
generating maritime zones of their own, then further differentiating islands in 
a narrower sense with their own territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and 
continental shelf, from rocks that only have a territorial sea. 
Concretising this equitable principle in the case of the insular lands of the 
SCS then requires determining who has sovereignty over each of them. This 
is a matter of general international law, which holds that each insular land, 
however small, that remains above water at high tide is capable of appropria-
tion by States.104 Such appropriation requires effective exercise of State power. 
Several types of state power are apt to acquire title over such land.105 Their 
actual exercise needs to be proportionate to the insular land in question. In 
remote regions it can be minimal. The absence of any objection by third States 
reinforces the title. The ICJ decision in Sovereignty over Pedra Branca is par-
ticularly illustrative, concerning disputed sovereignty over tiny uninhabited 
and uninhabitable islands in the Singapore Straits. There, the Court confirmed 
that original title over such land can be acquired by both territorial and per-
sonal historic exercise of authority, including over fishermen.106 Such historic 
action need not reflect a modern concept of sovereignty.107 Later factual (effec-
tive) exercise of power by another State does not transfer the original title thus 
acquired, in the absence of agreement or acquiescence.108 In addition, the 
103    Bay of Bengal Award, para. 279.
104    Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions, [2001] ICJ Rep 40, 102, para. 206. The Court 
found that Qit’at Jaradah, being 0.4 metres above water at high tide, was an island. On the 
probative issues of matter, see Territorial and Maritime Dispute, [2012] ICJ Rep 624, para. 36.
105    Territorial and Maritime Dispute, [2012] ICJ Rep 624, paras. 25–38; Caribbean Sea, [2007] 
ICJ Rep 659, paras. 168–208.
106    Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/
Singapore), [2008] ICJ Rep 12, 37–39, paras. 70–75, 79 [hereinafter Sovereignty over Pedra 
Branca].
107    Ibid., para. 79.
108    Dissenting Opinion of Judges Simma and Abraham in Sovereignty over Pedra Branca, 
para. 13; Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia) ([2002] 
ICJ Rep 625) concerned transfer of an original title to another sovereign by agreement.
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general temporal cut off is the time that the sovereignty dispute has crystal-
lized, so that acts by any of the disputants after that time are irrelevant.109 Any 
detailed application of these principles to the SCS insular lands is obviously 
beyond the scope of the present paper and will require further study.110
The Convention concretizes the foundational equitable principle that the 
land dominates the sea by creating maritime zones of the coastal state based 
on a norm of geographical distance from the relevant coats. As regards the 
capacity of the insular lands in the SCS to generate maritime zones, it needs to 
be noted that the terms “island” and “rock” that Art. 121 UNCLOS employs have 
never been defined in international adjudication. States retain a large margin 
of appreciation in each instance, in regard to the very consideration of specific 
insular features as well as whether they are generating an own territorial sea, 
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf remain a matter of apprecia-
tion. This is true for insular features near the mainland coast. State practice 
generally takes into account the effect of islands and even low-tide elevations 
in drawing agreed delimitation lines.111 In Black Sea, the Court accepted for 
instance that the parties had accorded to Serpent Island a 12 nm territorial 
sea by treaty, although they later disagreed on its status under Art. 121.112 It is 
also true for insular features further off the mainland coast.113 The Barents Sea 
Agreement apparently accords the Svalbard archipelago the capacity to gener-
ate its own continental shelf, independent of that of the Norwegian mainland.114
The delimitation of the maritime zones of two States with adjacent or oppo-
site coasts in the SCS can then follow the three-stage methodology described 
above. Still, the equidistance-cum-relevant circumstances method has so far 
 
109    Caribbean Sea, [2007] ICJ Rep 659, para. 117.
110    For diverging views in the literature, see Jianming Shen, China’s Sovereignty over the South 
China Sea Islands: A Historical Perspective, 2 Chinese J of Int’l L. (2002), at 94; Monique 
Chemilier-Grendeau, Sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratly Islands (Martinus Nijhoff, 
2000).
111    Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the 
Kingdom of Belgium on the delimitation of the continental shelf (done 8 October 1990, 
entered into force 7 April 1993), available at http://www.marineregions.org/documents/
FRA-BEL1990CS.pdf (last visited 29 April 2015).
112    Black Sea, [2009] ICJ Rep 61, para. 188.
113    Treaty between the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of 
the United States of America on the delimitation of the continental shelf in the western 
Gulf of Mexico beyond 200 nautical miles (done 9 June 2000, entered into force 17 January 
2001) 2143 UNTS 417.
114    Henriksen and Ulfstein, Maritime Delimitation, at 9.
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been judicially applied only for purposes of delimiting two overlapping claims 
based on the same conceptual entitlement, that is territorial sea, exclusive eco-
nomic zone, and continental shelf. It is not clear that and how it would apply to 
claims based at least partially on historic title, as it the case for the SCS. In such 
case, the use of the equidistance method may become inappropriate, in line 
with the caveat in Caribbean Sea. Or, States could consider historic title a rel-
evant circumstance to modify the provisional equidistance line at the second 
stage. Courts and tribunals have accepted as such a relevant circumstance 
one State being cut-off by the provisional equidistance line from claiming 
an exclusive economic zone or a continental shelf.115 But the list of relevant 
circumstances is open to further additions.116 
At any rate, equidistance/relevant circumstances remains one delimitation 
method and in this sense it is dispositive law. States remain free to base their 
delimitation agreement on other principles than the median line. In Maritime 
Dispute, the Court found and accepted a (tacit) agreement of the parties delim-
iting the territorial sea and parts of the exclusive economic zone in variance 
from the median line.117 Indeed, as the delimitation of maritime boundaries 
rests primarily on the agreement of the States, these are free in the criteria 
that they want to base their agreement on, including historic title. State prac-
tice has yielded some particularly innovative approaches, often as a result of 
particular geographic, historical, and other factors at play.118 In this practice, 
historic titles indeed often underlie express or tacit agreements.119
5.2 Historic Title and Uses
The second applicable equitable principle is historic title and historic use 
in the SCS, within and outside the Convention-defined maritime zones. 
Particularly for Asia, arbitral tribunals and courts have been ready to allo-
cate title to land territory on the basis of historic and more recent effectivités, 
115    Most recently, Bay of Bengal Award, paras. 110–114.
116    Malcolm Evans, Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation (OUP 1989).
117    Maritime Dispute (Peru v Chile), Judgment of 27 January 2014 (nyr), para. 91.
118    Further Jonathan I. Charney et al. (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, vol. 1–5 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 1993–2005).
119    For instance the Treaty concerning sovereignty and maritime boundaries in the area 
between the two countries, including the area known as Torres Strait, and related 
matters between Australia and Papua New Guinea (done December 1978; entered into 
force in February 1985, 1429 UNTS 207, includes a protected zone in the middle of the 
boundary that accommodates the interests of indigenous peoples, including their tradi-
tional fishing practices.
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including over water, where there is appropriate evidence.120 States have con-
siderable leeway in determining the exact legal regime for such title. The Land, 
Island and Maritime Dispute as well as the Eritrea/Yemen Award highlight that 
a regime of the joint use of waters disputed by the riparian States on historic 
grounds can be an equitable outcome. The Barents Sea Treaty accommodates a 
special regime for historic uses—fisheries—within an overall zonal approach 
to the disputed resources. Its preamble states that the parties are “aware of the 
traditional Norwegian and Russian fisheries in the Barents Sea”. In its operative 
part, Art. 4 prescribes that the fishing opportunities of either party shall not be 
adversely affected by the Treaty. The parties shall closely cooperate, with a view 
to maintain their existing respective shares of total allowable catch volumes 
and to ensure relative stability of their fishing activities for each of the stocks 
concerned. It bears noting that the Treaty embraces a more lenient standard 
for the consideration of existing fisheries for delimitation purposes, than the 
catastrophic effect on such fisheries that the jurisprudence has demanded in 
order to be considered a relevant circumstance capable of modifying the pro-
visional equidistance line.121
5.3 Equality of Outcome
Finally, an overarching equitable principle for States reaching a settlement 
of sea boundaries in the SCS may simply be absolute equality of outcomes.122 
Under it, the area of conflict demarcated by the overlapping claims would be 
divided on the basis equal shares for either party. This outcome-focus may 
be particularly appropriate where the claims are based on different delimita-
tion methods within the zonal approach. The Barents Sea Treaty is an illustra-
tion. That Treaty is apparently based on an equitable sharing of the disputed 
sea area arising from the overlap of the sector lines claimed by Russia and the 
median lines claimed by Norway.123 To ensure such parity of outcome, States 
then remain free to create and transfer functional rights over waters that 
120    In particular Arbitration Pursuant to an Agreement to Arbitrate dated 3 October 1996 
between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Republic of 
Yemen, First Stage, paras. 114–45 [hereinafter Eritrea/Yemen Award]; Sovereignty over Pedra 
Branca, [2008] ICJ Rep 12, 33, para. 52, goes back to the early 16th century to establish the 
Sultanate of Johor’s presence and the absence of rival claims over the disputed islands. 
In cases such as Minquiers and Ecrehos, [1954] ICJ Rep 47, and Western Sahara, [1975] 
ICJ Rep 12, the Court has preferred to focus on the situation closer in time to the dispute.
121    Gulf of Maine, [1984] ICJ Rep 246, para. 237.
122    Albin, Justice and Fairness, at 35 (“split-the-difference”).
123    Henriksen and Ulfstein, Maritime Limitation, at 6 with footnote 58 (citing a statement 
made by the Russian Foreign Minister on signing the Treaty).
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would fall within any of their maritime zones, regardless of whether these are 
covered by overlapping claims. Again, the Barents Sea Treaty provides illustra-
tion. Art. 3 of that Treaty signs over to Russia a sea area located within 200 nm 
of the Norwegian coast but beyond 200 nm from to the Russian coast. The 
Treaty makes clear that this area does not become part of the Russian exclusive 
economic zone but rather receives a special legal status. Such parity of out-
come-focus may also be appropriate where the claims to the disputed waters 
are based on the zonal approach by one party and the non-zonal approach of 
the other.
6 Conclusions
The 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention aspires to the internationally just 
distribution of the marine resources situated between the land and the deep 
seabed and high seas. This aspiration underlies not just their apportionment, 
but also the delimitation of the overlapping claims between several coastal 
States. The paper has demonstrated the Convention to form institutionalized 
oceans governance for that purpose. Where the claims of several coastal States 
overlap, the Convention requires that the resulting delimitation produce an 
equitable outcome. The Convention then provides machinery to achieve this 
indeterminate objective, comprising a judicial and a political mechanism. 
The judicially developed equitable principle of equidistance/relevant circum-
stances method in particular would apply to future boundary agreements 
between States as well. Still, primarily States are to provide a political solu-
tion through agreement. States retain a considerable margin of appreciation 
for States in regard to what they will consider an equitable outcome under 
two broad approaches. The Convention proffers the distributional approach 
that the land dominates the sea, realizing through the concept of the maritime 
zones for coastal states that it sets forth. While this is strictly geographical, 
the Convention also countenances historic title grounded in customary law 
as a non-geographical basis for resources distribution. The SCS then provides 
a litmus test for the Convention’s capacity of achieving a just distribution of 
ocean resources in this complex scenario of overlapping claims by riparian 
States based on zonal and non-zonal entitlements. No comprehensive judi-
cial decision-making is available there, given that China’s declaration under 
Art. 298(1)(a)(i) excepts all disputes relating to the delimitation of maritime 
zones or to historic title in that sea. Such equitable delimitation and thus dis-
tribution of the resources of the SCS must be achieved through one or several 
agreements concluded by the riparian States. Of particular relevance for the 
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SCS then are three equitable principles: that the land dominates the sea, com-
prising the consideration of its insular lands under disputed sovereignty and 
appropriate zonal delimitation; the recognition of historic title and historic 
uses of the SCS; and a focus on an outcome based on equal share of the dis-
puted waters for States, including through creation and transfer of functional 
rights. State practice, such as the recent Barents Sea Treaty, indicates how these 
principles could be concretized.
The analytic implication of the article’s finding that equitable maritime 
boundary delimitation is underpinned by the judicial and political institution-
alization is that that both mechanisms produce equitable principles capable 
of being applied in future cases. The challenge for analysts of the law of the sea 
then is to legally conceptualize the interaction of these principles. There are 
also implications for the relevant actors within this institutionalized oceans 
governance. For courts and tribunals, as judicial actors, the key implication is 
that the acquis judiciaire on equitable delimitation principles ought to be fur-
ther clarified on key issues, such as islands and historic title. The implication 
for States, as the political actors, is that they must take judicially developed and 
developing equitable principles into consideration, as these shape the “inter-
national law” standard that States have to base their agreed marine resources 
allocation on. Still, States may and indeed must make use of their considerable 
margin of appreciation in reaching an overall equitable result, and, in so doing, 
take guidance from relevant state practice.
